The concept of international system has been, and always been, the center of debate in the filed of international relations. The term itself can be very confusing. What is a system? Isn't it the international relations as we know simply a collection of episodes of international affairs? Isn't it the so called diplomacy an official interaction between civilized states? When IR scholar tried to depict international relations a century ago, they adopted classical works to explain the environment where states operate, compete, and interact. The core assumption of such environment is anarchy. Using Hobbes' word, this is a world "all against all". Every state is a unit in this environment; each of them is selfish. More importantly, no one can ensure the security of others.
The international system is a term that we describe such environment. Morton Kaplan once presented six types of systems. For over 3 decades, students of IR debated what constitute international system and how system can or must influence state behavior. Waltz, in his seminal book "Theory of International Politics", refute the previous system theories and call them "reductionism". He separates system level variables like anarchy from domestic politics like territorial aggression, therefore he constructs a level of analysis approach that establishes a theory of systemic effect.
The main question behind this clarification of terminology is what we are interested in-- how does international system explain state behavior. If states struggle to survive in anarchic world. They need to estimate, calculate, and measure the strength of other states. A powerful state is dreadful. It is capable to plunder and annihilate other states. Therefore, states always pay close attention to the material capability of itself and other states. This usually includes the size of military, the advancement of weaponry, the amount of territory,n number of population, and strategic resource or location controlled by a particular state. Material capability is a direct representation of a state's ability to conquer other states. In other words, material capability decides how powerful a state is.
International system is not a static map. State power grows and declines throughout time. There are various ways for a state to increase its power, usually from domestic change, like territory aggrandizement, new research breakthrough, and succession. States are sensitive to relative power change, not absolute power change. For example, State A has 1000 troop and recruit 300 soldiers and State B has 400 troop but recruit 600. Numerically state A should not be worried because its military still outnumbers state B by 300. But in reality, state A is nervous because B's military expansion rate is higher than A. If B continue to enlarge its military, it will eventually exceed A.
This explains an important phenomena in international politics: the rising state. Consider that we set current power distribution as status quo, and we know that state power fluctuates, then the states that quickly expand its power are rising states. The already powerful states are status quo states. Status quo states enjoy advantage in international system. They are powerful enough to ensure their survival in the system. But now there is a rising state in the system, and no one can guarantee this rising state would not threaten the survival of status quo state in the future.
Therefore, the status quo states need to deal with rising states. Historically, balance of power is the main tactic to deal with rising states. Several states having similar security interest stand together though formal alliance or informal alignment. The rising state, in order to counter status quo states, will also form its alliance. Theoretically, there will be two group of countries form a bipolar world in international system. The reason is simple, if there is a third party in the system, the other two will try to earn its allegiance and encourage it to join their side. It is difficult for a third party to remain neutral because it can be the target of the other two if it insists its neutrality. The tripolar system will crumble quickly so it is rather rare and short-lived in our history. Schweller argues that interwar period is a tripolar system consisted US, Germany, and the Soviet. Germany launch war to absorb other states in order to attain victory in its competition of European hegemony with the Soviets. Germany did defeat the Soviet during WWII and almost achieved its European dominance.
Balance of power can be a simple aggregation of material power. If the aggregate power of two camps are equivalent, no states will risk an unpromising war. Therefore, balance of power theory argues that bipolar system where competing states have equal power tend to be less prone to war. On the contrary, a highly unbalanced competition will result in war that the stronger will eliminate the weaker party. Waltz and Sagan further examine the balance of power in nuclear age. Nuclear weapon as a powerful defensive weapon with its unprecedented destructive power can deter the attack from a enemy. Ironically, bipolar nuclear deterrence brings fear for nuclear war as well as prospect of peace. Soviet Union never risked invading west Berlin or NATO states for the fear of US counter attack; similarly, US discouraged Chiang Kai-Shek's ambition to return to mainland China in order not to provoke Soviet involvement.
Balance of power is theoretically sound and usually adopted by modern states as Kissinger outlined in his book "Diplomacy". But it is not always effective empirically. WWI seems to be a failing example of balance of power. The Triple Entente failed to deter Triple Alliance. And Italy betrayed its allies in this war. The end of Cold War also poses a challenge to the theory. There is only one superpower left in the system, and other state did not form an alliance to counter it. On the contrary, US hegemony is widely accepted and tolerated. The US did not use force against major great powers in the system but stay peace with them, even though it did use force in Balkan and middle east. The hegemonic stability and great power peace suggests that a preponderant power does not necessarily cause war and conflict.
This is called power transition theory in IR. It argues exactly contrary to balance of power theory. War is more likely when two states or camps reach equivalent power. Because states care about relative gains, equivalent power means one state will surpass the other very soon. To preserve the status quo and tactical advantage, the more powerful one will launch attack to weaken or eliminate its enemy. In other words, balance of power is dangerous. Any party in such relationship will open war any time. Preponderance power will ensure that no one is dare to challenge the status quo. The hegemon also want to maintain such advantage in the system, so it will not repress the weak states but cooperate with them and domesticate those who do not behave as the hegemony wants. Weak states may exchange survival, and perhaps prosperity, by its submission.
The debate between balance of power school and power transition school does not have clear conclusion. It is common in ivory tower. Two camps continue using empirical evidence to support their theory. Our understanding of international politics has gained significant progress during the process. In the unipolar world today, it seems the power transition theory can better explain the world order. But at the same time, we have to remember that the world also pay close attention to the rising power in the system. The rising China, for example, may become the next pole of a bipolar balance of power. The nature of international system remains to be anarchic as realist always argues. States still employ balancing tactics, and power competition is still the core of the game in international politics. Although we have gained extensive knowledge about international system, the systemic effect on state behavior will continue to be the most important subject in our discussion of IR.
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